Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2018

JODIE K. LEVITT, M.D., Plaintiff/Appellant, v. IASIS HEALTHCARE
HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL., Defendants/Appellees. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Robinson Jr.; attorney for appellant.
Jonathan A. Dibble, Elaina M. Maragakis, Erin M. Adams; attorneys for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Levitt v. Iasis Healthcare, No. 20180260 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2018).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4171

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

34L
l(A.Ct,(2) ,D+-11 Q ti

QffilVCIN31V:::>

z-2° 11~
No. 20180260-CA

Ua,v ct--, 2 1, Zot i

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JODIE K. LEVITT,

M.D.,
Plaintiff/Appellant.,

v.
IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

On appeal from a summary judgment entered in Third District
Court, the Honorable Andrew Stone presiding.
District Court case no. 160900952.

Oral Argument Requested

e

Jonathan A. Dibble
Elaina M. Maragakis
Erin M. Adams
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

John Robinson Jr.
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN ROBINSON JR.

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorney for the Appellant

Attorneys for the Appellees
FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

FEB 14 2019
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

aoaru

No. 20180260-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JODIE K. LEVITT,

M.D.,
Plaintiff/Appellant.,

v.
IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

On appeal from a summary judgment entered in Third District
Court, the Honorable Andrew Stone presiding.
District Court case no. 160900952.

Oral Argument Requested

Jonathan A. Dibble
Elaina M. Maragakis
Erin M. Adams

John Robinson Jr.
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN ROBINSON JR.

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

36 State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attomey for the Appellant

Attorneys for the Appellees

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Table of Contents

Introduction ..................................................................................... 1
Argument ......................................................................................... 3
I. This Court should reverse because the district court applied the
wrong legal standard to the Hospital's assertion of the privilege ... 3

A. The district court improperly required Levitt to overcome the
privilege, which is contrary to Utah law .................................. 5
B. The court's improper burden shifting resulted in obvious
evidentiary mistakes, and it materially prejudiced Levitt on
summary judgment............................................................... 8
II. Because the court erred on the privilege issue, summary judgment
was inappropriate as a matter of law ......................................... 13
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 15

(,),

liif,I

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Table of Authorities

~

Cases
Allred v. Saunders,
2014 UT 43, 342 P.3d 204 .............................................................. 5, 6, 7

Andalex Resources,, Inc. v. Myers,
871 P .2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ..................................................... 13

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
4 77 U .s. 242 {1986} ....................................................................... 13, 14

Ardisana v. Nw. Cmty. Hosp .., Inc.,
342 Ill. App. 3d 741, 795 N.E.2d 964 (2003) .......................................... 11
Benson v. LH.C. Hosps.., Inc.,
866 P .2d 537 (Utah 1993} ............................................................ passim

Nielson v. ZwedishAmerican Hosp.,
2017 IL App (2d) 160743, 80 N .E.3d 706 ............................................... 11

Wilson v. IHC Hosps.., Inc.,
2012 UT 43, 289 P.3d 369 ....................................................... 6, 7, 11, 12

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

No. 20180260-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
]ODIE K. LEVITT, M.D.,

Plaintiff/Appellant
v.

IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION

Jodie Levitt, M.D. was temporarily suspended from practice by IASIS
Healthcare, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike
(collectively, the Hospital) without the benefit of due process. During and
after the suspension, the Hospital refused to disclose the specific grounds
for Levitt's summary suspension, which undermined the entire process.
Further, the Hospital used the specter of adding a permanent record of
the suspension to her national file if she chose to exercise her right to a
Fair Hearing, which she was entitled to under the Medical Staff Bylaws, to
discourage her from doing so. Seeking the only recourse available to her,
Levitt filed this lawsuit in an attempt to discover the basis for her
summary suspension and to vindicate her professional reputation.

1
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Her attempt was frustrated by the Hospital's refusal to produce the
documentation behind the suspension-the very documents that would
allow Levitt to understand the basis of her suspension or argue that the
suspension was improper. In effect the Hospital's took the position that,
because she chose to comply with criteria for reinstatement from the
suspension, Levitt could not obtain information about her suspension or
have a Fair Hearing.
Once Levitt challenged its disciplinary process in this suit, the Hospital
took the position that all information relevant to her suspension could be
withheld as privileged under the peer and care review privileges. Over
Levitt's objection, the district court ratified the Hospital's position and
allowed the Hospital to withhold almost all of its disciplinary file. The
court thus entered summary judgment in favor of the Hospital because,
without access to the documents underlying her suspension, Levitt could
not prevail.
The court, however, allowed the Hospital to withhold its trove of
evidence without substantively examining the evidentiary bases for the
claimed privilege. In fact, the district court failed to conduct any analysis
~

of the purportedly privileged documents-it neither examined the
evidentiary bases for the claimed privilege nor conducted an in camera
review of any documents. The root cause of the error was this: the court
mistakenly reversed the burden.

2
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Under Utah law, the party seeking to withhold documents must
establish that a privilege applies. But here, the district court imposed the
burden on Levitt and required her to overcome the assertion of privilege.
The court thus abused its normally-wide discretion by applying the wrong
legal standard to case, and this Court should remand so the correct legal
standard can be applied.

ARGUMENT

I.

This Court should reverse because the district court applied the
wrong legal standard to the Hospital's assertion of the privilege.

The party asserting a privilege bears the burden of properly invoking
it. In this case, Levitt moved the court to compel the Hospital to disclose
documents relevant to its disciplinary actions. In response, the Hospital
asserted the privilege almost categorically. See Aplee. Br. at 11 (discussing
the 137-page privilege log). Although the trial court did require the
Hospital to create a privilege log in response to Levitt's motion, the log
lacked the information necessary to determine whether the Hospital
properly justified its invocation of privilege.
Instead of grappling with the substance of the purportedly privileged
documents, the privilege log relied almost exclusively on verbatim
quotations of the statutory language of the care review privilege. And
more importantly, it failed to tie the verbatim rule language to the
substance of the related document in any meaningful way. See generally
3
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r. 435-571 (the privilege log). 1 Indeed, the Hospital claimed the privilege
. over huge numbers of documents that don't appear to fall within he scope
of any privilege. For example, the Hospital withheld a "SLRMC Checklist
of Clinical Privileges for Jodie K. Levitt, MD." R. 560. But the log contains
no explanation of why a list of Levitt's clinical privileges is subject to the
privilege. The Hospital also withheld "Various versions of Jodie K. Levitt
Curriculum Vitae." R. 558. Likewise, it's not at all clear from the log how

@j)

Levitt's own CV could be considered privileged. In essence, the log on its
face shows that the Hospital claimed the privilege over everything in its
disciplinary file without regard to whether any privilege actually applied.
Nonetheless, the district court allowed the Hospital to withhold all the
documents it wanted to. R. 1065 ("Defendants have properly invoked the
peer and care review privileges."). In support of that decision, the
Hospital on appeal argues that "Levitt never challenged a single document
on the privilege log, though the onus was on her to do so." Aplee. Br. at 27.
That argument relies on procedural fact is technically correct, but in a

~

The privilege log appears to be corrupted in the record on appeal. It
seems that some sort of error cut off the right side of the log when it was
converted from its original landscape orientation into a portrait
orientation for transmission to this Court. That issue is the subject of a
motion to correct the record file concurrently with this brief, and the
entire privilege log is attached to that motion for the Court's convenience.
1

4
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way that misperceives the legal issue in this case. And in any event, the
onus was not on Levitt.
Instead of challenging individual documents, Levitt challenged the
sufficiency of the privilege log in total. See generallyr. 1191-95 (arguing
that the log, as a whole, lacked evidentiary basis); see also, e.g., r. 1192
(noting that, although Levitt had requested them, "I cannot find any
reference whatsoever in the privilege log for any claimed privilege of
either the quality file or the credentialing file of plaintiff'); Aplee. Br. at 27
n.13 (conceding that "Levitt challenged 'all' the documents").
Thus, the Hospital's argument on appeal misses the thrust of Levitt's
legal contentions below-her point was that the Hospital's privilege log
was insufficient as a matter oflaw. Seer. 690-94. The Hospital's contrary
assertion-that Levitt bore the burden of challenging each individual
document-is therefore unpersuasive, and the district court's decision
suffers from the same legal flaw. This Court should reverse for two
reasons.
A. The district court improperly required Levitt to overcome the
privilege, which is contrary to Utah law.

The party seeking discoverable information does not need to prove that
it is not privileged. Indeed, the opposite is true: in Utah, "the burden [is]
on the party asserting a privilege to establish that the material sought is
protected from discovery." Allred v. Saunders, 2014 UT 43, «r 25, 342 P.3d
204. The burden flows from the rules of civil procedure, which presume a
5
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party is entitled to information relevant to her claims. In the event a party
withholds discoverable information by claiming a privilege, that party
"shall describe the nature of the documents ... in a manner that ... will
enable other parties to evaluate the claim." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(8)(A).
Like happened here, the party asserting the privilege will typically
produce a privilege log with the necessary details. However, to meet the
requirements of rule 26, the log must have real substance: "a proper

~

privilege log must provide sufficient foundational information for each
withheld document or item to allow an individualized assessment as to the
applicability of the claimed privilege." Allred, 2014 UT 43, Cf 27. The
reasoning behind that requirement is clear. It is because "there is danger
in construing the peer review privilege too broadly." Benson v. I.H.C.
Hosps._, Inc., 866 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah 1993).

Here, the court appears to have assumed that that the log was per se
adequate without considering the danger of overbroad application of the
privilege. Indeed, the record does not show that the court ever reviewed
the privilege log to reach any initial conclusion about the log's adequacy.
And in any event, the court explicitly placed the burden on Levitt to
overcome the Hospital's assertions: "It strikes me as it's your burden to
come forward and say, 'I don't think this is a legitimate claim of
privilege."' R. 1196.
The court's presumption of adequacy, and its incorrect burden
shifting, are contrary to our law however. As the supreme court has
6
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explained, the privilege "protects only those documents prepared

speci.icallyto be submitted for review purposes." Wilson v. IHC Hasps.,
Inc., 2012 UT 43, Cf 114, 289 P.3d 369 (simplified). "It does not extend to
documents that mightor couldbe used in the review process." Id.
(simplified). And because "the burden [is] on the party asserting a
privilege to establish that the material sought is protected from
discovery," Allred, 2014 UT 43, Cf 25, the mere existence of a privilege log
is not enough to justify withholding documents. Instead, the "privilege log
must contain sufficient individualized information" so that the court and
parties can evaluate whether the privilege actually applies. Id. Cf 27.
Specifically, the log must be robust enough "to ensure that any nonprivileged documents or items (such as patient medical records) that have
made their way into a care-review or peer-review file are not shielded
from discovery." Id.
In the district court, Levitt objected to the privilege log and argued it
was insufficient on its face. Seer. 1190-95. Instead of examining the log as
required by Allred, though, the court shifted the burden to Levitt and
required her to attack individual documents. R. 1196, 1065. The district
court thus erred as a matter of law, and this Court should reverse so that
the court can conduct the Allred analysis and test whether the Hospital
met its burden.

7
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B. The court's improper burden shifting resulted in obvious
evidentiary mistakes, and it materially prejudiced Levitt on
summary judgment.

The problem with district court's erroneous burden shifting was that it
allowed the Hospital to protect wide swaths of material that are not
entitled to any privilege. Indeed, the privilege log contains many entries
that demonstrate the overbreadth of the Hospital's assertions (and thus
demonstrate the harm to Levitt's case caused by the court's decision to
sustain the blanket privilege). Here are several examples, which stand out
against backdrop of the privilege's purpose, which is "to protect health
care providers who furnish information regarding the quality of health
care rendered by any individual or facility." Benson v. LH.C. Hosps.J Inc.,
866 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Utah 1993) (simplified).

First, the Hospital claimed privilege on documents that were actually
disclosed to Levitt herself. For example, Levitt was granted access shown
a list of cases giving rise to her suspension. R. 1222 ("And at that point, she
was allowed to see what Dr. Levitt characterized as a cursory list of the
cases giving rise to the suspension."); see alsor. 1232 (explaining that the
Hospital shared a "cursory list of those peer reviewed cases ... for about 20
seconds"). At minimum, any potential privilege regarding actuallydisclosed documents would have been waived when they were shown to
Levitt. See Utah R. Evid. 510(a) ("A person ... waives the privilege if the
person ... : (1) voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any
significant part of the matter or communication."). Nonetheless, the
8
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Hospital later withheld the list of peer reviewed cases. Seer. 1004
(explaining that the short viewing of peer review cases was all Levitt ever
learned about the basis for the Hospital's action).
Second, the Hospital claimed privilege on documents that Levitt
herself provided to the Hospital. One group of examples are emails that
Levitt sent to the Hospital as part of the process. See, e.g., r. 480 (claiming
(iJll

as privileged an email from Levitt "regarding reappointment"). Another
example is a "handwritten note" that Levitt delivered to the chairperson of
the Medical Executive Committee in response "to a request for questions
in writing." R. 444.
Third, the Hospital claimed privilege on documents that substantially
predated the peer review or care review. For example, the Hospital
withheld a letter from Brian Dunn to Levitt regarding "Initial Approval for
Associate Status" dated in 2002. R. 435; see also id. (claiming privilege over
a "letter from a physician re: recommendation for staff appointment").

~

Fourth, the Hospital claimed privilege on documents originating from
and going to the Medical Executive Committee (Executive Committee). It
did so by characterizing the Executive Committee as a peer review body
that performed peer review functions. E.g., r. 444. However, it's not clear
the Executive Committee engages in peer review, because the group
actually conducting the peer review was the "Credentials Committee." See
r. 440 (claiming Credentials Committee minutes and recommendation as
privileged). Thus, it appears that the Hospital conflated the two different
9
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committees. But in any event, there is a logical problem with conflating
the separate bodies, which is apparent in the Hospital's argument on
appeal. In its brief, the Hospital asserts that Levitt's hospitalization for
depression, which was disclosed to the chair of the Executive Committee,
was not disclosed to the Credentials Committee. Aplee. Br. at 6. According
to the Hospital, that failure to disclose the hospitalization obstructed
Levitt's peer review. See id. However, if the Executive Committee's
knowledge of a fact cannot be imputed to the Credentials Committee, then
the Executive Committee cannot have been part of the peer review
process in the first instance-the two are mutually exclusive.
Fifth, the Hospital claimed privilege over documents that would have
informed Levitt of what she was suspended for. As the Hospital argued to
the district court, "there has been nothing cited that she's entitled to know
those things. That's not provided in the bylaws and, in fact, it happens all
the time that investigations are undertaken without informing the
physician." R. 1244. But here the Hospital suspended Levitt-this was not

~

some run of the mill investigation that resulted in no action. And given
that the purpose of peer review is to "improve health care rendered," see

Benson, 866 P.2d at 540, the idea that Levitt was precluded from
understanding the nature of her suspension doesn't make sense. Although
the deliberative process may be privileged, its result and reasoning cannot
be. "Results of the peer-review process are not privileged and are

10
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discoverable." Nielson v. ZwedishAmerican Hosp., 2017 IL App (2d)
160743, ff 38, 80 N.E.3d 706.
And finally, the Hospital withheld Levitt's own professional files. For
example, she requested her credentialing and quality control files as part
of discovery in this case. R. 1192. Yet the Hospital declined to produce the
records, even though they were not listed as privileged in the log. Id.
These examples prove the overbreadth of the district court's privilege
decision. Levitt's quality file is a prime example, because the quality file
was created as part of the Hospital's normal course of business-the fact
that the file was later used by the Credentialing Committee doesn't matter.
See Nielson, 2017 IL App (2d} 160743, ffff 74-75(concluding "that the
[quality control files] are not privileged" because they serve a "dual
purpose" of aiding "medical-professional self-evaluation").
Likewise, documents that far predate the peer review illustrate the
same point. Levitt's "Initial Approval for Associate Status" dated in 2002,
for instance, cannot be privileged because documents cannot be
"prepared specifically'' for something that hasn't happened yet. See
Wilson, 2012 UT 43, tf 114; accord Ardisana v. Nw. Cm-ty.. Hosp .., Inc. , 342
Ill. App. 3d 741, 748, 795 N.E.2d 964 (2003) (explaining the privilege "does
not protect against disclosure of information generated before a peerreview process begins or after it ends"). And of course it is self evident
that documents like Levitt's CV, which the Hospital also withheld, fall
outside the scope of any privilege.
11
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In short, it appears on the face of the privilege log that the Hospital
asserted the privilege over everything that the Credentialing Committee

~

had access to regardless of whether the material was "prepared

speci.icallyto be submitted for review purposes." See Wilson, 2012 UT 43,

er 114. And that's the problem: the Hospital created a black box around its
entire process that prevented Levitt from meaningfully understanding the
actions taken against her, and prevented her from meaningfully engaging
at the summary judgment phase. But as explained above, obscuring the
entire process is not the point of the privilege. Instead, the privilege
protects certain aspects of the Hospital's deliberative process-but not the
whole thing. See Wilson, 2012 UT 43,

er 114 (explaining the privilege "does

not extend to documents that mightor couldbe used in the review process
(simplified)); see also Benson, 866 P.2d at 540 ("[T]here is danger in

~

construing the peer review privilege too broadly.").
Taken together the Hospital's overbroad assertion of the privilege
created, in the words of the district court, a "shroud of secrecy." R. 1247.
The privilege log, however, did not justify the broad assertion of privilege
that created the shroud. And when the district court overruled Levitt's
objections to the legal sufficiency of the privilege log, that decision had
the effect of stifling Levitt's ability to withstand summary judgment. This
Court should reverse so that district court can conduct a review of the

~

privilege log in light of the correct burden, which Utah law places on the
Hospital.
12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

II.

Because the court erred on the privilege issue, summary judgment
was inappropriate as a matter of law.

A nonmoving party never bears a burden of proof on summary
judgment. On appeal the Hospital suggests the opposite, namely that this
Court should affirm in part because Levitt would need to prove bad faith
or malice with clear and convincing evidence at trial, which the Hospital
argues she cannot do. See Aplee. Br. at 15-16. Specifically, the Hospital
cites Andalex Resource5;, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), for the proposition that "a party must prove a claim with clear and
convincing evidence at the summary judgment stage if that is the burden
required at trial." Aplee. Br. at 16.
But that is not the rule from Andalex. Indeed, the language that the
Hospital quotes only appears in a parenthetical describing the holding of a
different case. That other case is the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and it says
nothing about the nonmovant having a burden of proof on summary
judgment. Instead, Anderson stands for the proposition that "the
determination of whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a
jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to
the case." 477 U.S. at 254.
As the Supreme Court went on to say, its holding "does not denigrate
the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits." Id at
255. Even when the burden of proof is clear and convincing, "[c]redibility
13
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determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge." Id.
On summary judgment, then, the trial court must determine whether
there is a genuine issue of disputed fact such that a jury applying the
relevant evidentiary standard "could reasonably find for either the
plaintiff or the defendant." Id. And just like with summary judgment on
the more common preponderance standard, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant [Levitt] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in [her] favor." Id.

~

The Hospital's argument about Levitt's burden on summary judgment
thus fails to persuade because it misconstrues the nature of the summary
judgment inquiry. To defeat summary judgment, Levitt only had to come
forward with was enough evidence from which, along with justifiable
inferences, a juror could find clear and convincing proof of malice or bad
faith. See id.
That said, the Hospital's argument about the summary judgment
burden does not affect the outcome of this appeal. That is because the
district court's legal error described above-its improper shifting of the
burden, which allowed the Hospital to withhold far too many
documents-made it impossible for Levitt to defend against summary
judgment. That is, the court's pre-summary judgment decision to sustain

14
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the Hospital's overbroad privilege assertion prevented Levitt from
discovering the very evidence she needed to prove her case.
Under Benson v. LH.C. Hosps._, Inc., 866 P.2d 537 (Utah 1993), the
proper remedy in such circumstances is to remand. "If indeed there are
documents that should be in the medical record that are not found there,
then the statutory privileges are being abused, and that information and
those documents are discoverable." Id. at 540. "Because [Defendants] are
asserting privileges, it is their burden to show that nothing is missing
from the medical record," and this Court should remand so that the trial
court can "review all the documents at issue" and "determine ... which
documents are privileged and not subject to discovery and which are
nonprivileged and therefore discoverable." See id. After that
determination is made, the district court will be able to meaningfully
apply the correct summary judgment standard from Anderson.
CONCLUSION

The district court's erroneous privilege analysis made it impossible for
Levitt to dispute facts on summary judgment, and this Court should
therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings that
properly analyze the Hospital's claim of privilege in accordance with Utah
law.

15
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